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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
•• 0 ••

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Tr.is is a reply brief in answer to the allegaticns
and arguments as set forth in the brief of the resp<n-

:ient.

POINT 1
THE ISSUES RAISED IN THIS APPEAL ARE JUSI'ICliBLE
Respondent suggests that appellant should have
appealed the errors connected With his
::uilty plea, and that this appeal should be dismissed

1.

because he failed to do so.

Respcndent cites Bryant

\.• Turner, 19 u. 284,

v. Turner, 21 u. 2d 96,

in support of this claim.

However, the sentence which appellant is serving
in the Utah State R-ison wa.s imposed

l"l 1967, the supplement to vol. 8

ai

u.c •.A..

March

was published,

which contain.ed guidelines for the acceptm ce

pleas

by

Utah trial courts (77-24-6,

14, 1966.

u.c.A..,

or

1967 supp.).

Ju-ring the summer of 1969, and after appellant had
filed his notice of appeal in this case,

395

u.s.

BOJkin

v.

238, and Belgard v. Turner, Case No. C

95-69 (n.c. Utah), were both decided by the courts.
This appeal is valid and complies with Brya.nt beca.use, in additicn to a denial of due process, unusual
circumstances are present in this case.
The past few years have witnessed a number of new
legal guidelineg written by the

u.s.

Suprens Court, and

the application of these standards to existing law has
substantially revised the scope of judicial review.
kppellant was not able to anticipate these future court
decisions regarding constitutional guarantees for aie

r1ho plead guilty, and lo did not at the time tmder:;tand the nature and extent of the errors stated L'l

trJs appeal.
'I''herefore, the issues presented in this appeal are
:iot

judicata, because tmtil these court decisicns
a trial court's duties with regard to

ta.."1.ce of guilty pleas were published, the nature of

the errors stated in this appeal and their relaticn to
t'.le ccnstitutianaJ._ guarantees as explained in

Boykin

cr.d Belgard were not "something which (was) lmown or

should be lmawn • • • at the time judgment was entered,"
so this appeal is in accordance with the principles

s-':.ated in Brown v. Turner, supra, by virtue of the

r-1le of law set forth in L:inkletter v. Walker, 361

D.S. 618 (1965).

POINT 11
1 OF APPELLANT 1 S BRIEF IS A VALID ISSUE

Appellant is appealing an order of disr.Ii.ssal of

his petiticn for a writ of habeas corpus (Uo.

April 16, 1969) wherein the

185104,

Stewart M. Han-

sen stated:
"• • • the petiticner was properly sentenced,

tha.t he
:!!!£:l competent counsel
•
(Emphasis added.)
• • • •
S:i.:1cc this was the conclusicn of the 1CJ11er court, and
t:1e grmmds upon Which the peti ticn was denied, the

'.luesticn of the adequacy of defense counsel must, of

:iecessi ty, be considered an integral pa.rt of the proceedi. ngs, and the ref ore is subject to attack en appeal.
Also, appeal is a right, and gull.!"a:nteed under uta-i

law by Secticn

77-1-8(7), u.c.A.(Vol. 8).
POillT lll

WAS Nor

REPRESOOED BY CDUNSEL

When a defendant enters a plea of guilty in court,
proceedings are usually, as in appell.a.nt•s case,

su,inna.ry·, and the gravity of the errors comctl.tted may
not be ¥P<irent until after the hearing is canpleted.
Unlike the case of People v. IG.imek,

172 Cal. !pp.

2d 36, which was a jury trial and continued far a ccmsiderable

of time, appellant •s appearances in

court generally lasted for only a matter of a few minutes, and he did not completely understand the nature
of the proceedings or realize their outoome.
In addition, appellant did not believe that he was

4.

recrJ.ired i:o enter objections and, in effect, ccnduct

'.d.s own defense, for he assumed that his court appointed attorney would see that his rights were protected
and properly represent

-

him.

This Court has explored this matter in the case of

State v. Mannion, 19 u.

SOS,

and therein declareda

11 That

which law requires and makes- essential
en trial of defendant, charged with felcny,
cannot be dispensed 1li. th, either by ccnsent
of defendant or by his failure to object to
mauthorized methods pursued by those in
authori ty.n
(As cited in Vol. 8, u.c.A., Secticn 77-1-8, 1.)
Before appearing in court to change his plea, appel-

13.nt ha.d been advised and assured by Mr. Mitsunaga, his

court appointed counsel, that he could expect cledncy
from the court by so pleading and that such clemency
would be in the f orrn of a sentence in the County Jail

on a misdemeanor charge.
'Jy

This is substantiated in part

h of the transcript

of the hearing (respcndant •s

supplemental record) where Nir. Mitsmaga requested that
the court refer appellant's case to the probation and

parole department.
Such inducements by attorneys to pursuade a defendant to change his plea. were reeoently ruled to be

u:.1constit.utional by the Supreme Court of Missouri in

440 s.w.

v.

2d

441,

and the court said, in

essence, that:
''Proof that defendant's guilty plea was ind11ced by his attorney's assurances that proba. tion muld be granted would entitle
defendant to vacatur of his plea."
(Quoted from Criminal Law Bulletin, Sept.,

1969, P• 442.)

While probatim was not expressly promised in this
case by cotmsel, clemency in the form of a light sentence was used to effect a change of plea.
However, at the sentencing hearing, Mr. Mitsmaga was
absent, and the court made no reference to a.rry report
that may have been received from the probaticn department, nor were any other matters mentioned, either by
the court or by cotmsel, touch:U:lg en the circumstances
of

case regarding recormnendations or possibilities

')-'. probation, leniency, or a possible jail sentence.
In this particular case, the sentencing sessicn was
probably the most crucial stage of the court proceedings;
and Mr. Mitsunaga, who was fanrl.liar with all of the

aspects and ramifications concerning the case, was not
pi:"esent in order to insure that his promises of leniency

6.

crr his request for a recornmendaticn by the probaticn
department had been looked llito by the court.

Such an

error was ccnsid.ered unccnsti tuticnaJ.. as violating a
defendant's Sixth Amendimnt guarantees

-

S:nith,

4ll F. 2d 733 (6th

v.

Cir., 1969), where tha court

held that defence counsel's invollllltary absence because

of illness at the time when the jury verdict was r&tu.med was a denial of the right to effective assistance
of comsel at all critical stages of the proceedings

agaiinst him, and the district judge's polling of the
jury did not cure the error.

Appellant submits that his counsel's absence at

tne sentencing hearing was an error even more grmre
that which took place in Smith, for it was appella.nt 1 s

trust in the promises and assurances of defence

counsel that caused the guilty plea to be entered.
Utah law is also explicit en this matter, for a
c0llateral reference in

77-1-8, u.c.A. (Vol. 8), alludes

to 28 A.L.R. 2d 1240, by quoting:
"Absence of counsel for accused at time
of sentence as requiring vacaticn thereof or
other relief."

7.

POINT lV

APPELLANT WAS Nor FULLY ADVISE:D OF THE
C01JSEQUEHCES OF HIS GUILTY PLEA
The respondent alleges th:l.t appellant was thoroughly
ad'rised of the consequences of his guilty plea, and has
submitted a transcript of the proceed!l.ngs to substa.."1.t:.ate this claim.

(This transcript, incidently, is in-

correct.)

A reading of this reoord will, however, show that
appellant's case is not dissimi.J.a.r to that of Belgard
v. Turner, Case No. C 95-69 (D.C. Utah), in that nowhere
:L."1 the record is there a:rry indication that appellant

was advised of any ccnstituticnal rights, or that he
mlderstood the nature of the charge.

He was cnly told

t'.iat he might be sent to prison.

This was a deciding factor in Belgard, as t:he court
e;-:-ola.:ined on pages 7, 8 and 9 of the opinicn:
ltQi such a record, serious questicns arise
as to the voll.ll'ltariness and particularly as to
the l.ll'lderstanding nature (Sic) of the plea • •
• • Unlike the record in
(Boyidn v. Ala395 u.s. 238), the record before us here
is not silent , but it is hardly better and in
some respects it is worse, than a silent record.
Without leaving the m:i.tter to a
of
sumpticn or supposi.. ticn, perhaps ccnsistent

8.

-with the idea that advice actc:all:y wi.s
ve:i,
the record express1y shews that tLe plaini:iff
did not have explained to hir.: the nature of
tLe charr:e,
about possible defer.ses,
• • • and other matters which would be necessary to understand in order to render a nle'l
The .J!l.J:r vital
the. plaint:_ff >1as told was the extent of ti1e nossible
prnush."'.lent • • • •"
·
'l'he record in the present case, as in Bel.;;ard, does
rec, show that appellant was advised of any

::.:::-':,eed by the Constitution; and this was held by the

:·,s, Supreme Court in Boykin to be requisite for an
intelli.ri:ent waiver.

These riGhts include: the privi-

::..er:e a':'a5nst compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed
by tl:e Fifth Amendment and applicable to the States by

r-c1.scr.. of the Fourtee!'lth.

Malloy v. Hogan, 378

'"'.'\o rir'i1t to a trial by jury.
' • S.

145.

u.s.

1.

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391

The rie;ht to confront cme 1 s accusers.

2',_:_r:ter v. Te,"'\:as, 380 U.S. 400.
CC)Jile

rights and privileges are also assi.:.red

'.r A..i.-ticle 1, Secticms 7 and J2 o-f.' the Cansti tutian of
:.·tah, a."ld by Section

77-l-8, U.c .A. (Vol. S).

Appellroit su'bnits that he was not advised of the
of the char::;e to which he entered a plea of
-- i l ty, and was not advised of his rir,hts in relation

to this charge and the plea entered thereto; especially

since appellant has only just discovered that in order
for a crime of theft to constitute grand larceny, the

money or property taken must exceed the value of fifty
dollars, and the amount allegedly stolen by appellant
and

his co-defendant in the crime lli. th which he was

charged and to which he plead guil.ty was les1 than thirty
dollars.

The court did not seek to determine whether grand
larceny as defined in Section 76-36-h(l)(Vol. 81 U.C..t.)

actually bad been colllmitted, and al.so did not advise
that if less than fifty dollars was inTI>lved
in the theft, he could not be guil.ty of grand larcell1',
and

therefore he did not make a knowledgeable waiver or

enter a valid plea to this charge, as al'oresaid.
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing, in addition to his brief, appel-

lant suggests that he bas been substantially denied due
process and equal protection of the laws, in that he
was not made aware of the fact that the crime with which

he was charged could not be construed as grand larceny
because the amount taken was leu than .fifty dollars.
10;.

consequently, the sentence imposed by the lower court
,,,15

not only improper; it was illegal.

.lppellant

therefore again urges this Court to reverse the decision
of the lower court and set aside his plea of guilty.

R&spectfUlly submitted,

Pro Se

December ll, 1969
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